Poland and Norway approach nuclear energy from two different perspectives. That is precisely why it is worth comparing their approaches.
Nuclear energy is once again at the centre of the European energy debate. This is driven not only by climate considerations, but also by security of supply, growing electricity demand, the need to stabilise power systems and the necessity of ensuring competitive energy prices for industry.
At NEXUS Consultants, we have been analysing for some time how different countries approach the preparation and implementation of nuclear energy programmes. A particularly interesting comparison can be made between Poland’s “Polish Nuclear Power Programme” of 2020, updated in June 2026, and the Norwegian report NOU 2026:4 “Nuclear Energy in Norway?” (hereinafter also referred to as NOU).
At first glance, the two documents may seem difficult to compare. Poland has already decided to develop nuclear energy, while Norway is still analysing whether, and under what conditions, it should pursue this path. Yet it is precisely this difference that makes the comparison so valuable.
The Polish document primarily answers the question:
What, when and why do we want to build?
The Norwegian report places much greater emphasis on the question:
What conditions must first be created for such a programme to be successfully implemented?
This leads to several very important conclusions that are also relevant to Poland.
Two documents, two philosophies.
The Polish Nuclear Power Programme sets out a clear objective: the construction of nuclear power plants in Poland with a total capacity of approximately 6–9 GWe, based on large, proven Generation III(+) pressurised water reactors.
The Programme justifies this decision on three grounds: energy security, climate and environmental considerations, and economics.
The Norwegian Commission, by contrast, begins with two much more open questions: what role nuclear energy could play in Norway’s energy system and what would be required if Norway decided to introduce it.
This is not a minor editorial difference. It represents a fundamentally different decision-making logic.
Poland starts with the decision and builds an implementation model around it. Norway first seeks to define the complete set of conditions necessary to make a future decision feasible.
In many areas, the two documents are surprisingly consistent.
Both Poland and Norway regard nuclear energy as a stable, low-carbon source of energy with the potential to play an important role in ensuring energy system security.
Both documents also emphasise the importance of:
human resources and expertise, an effective regulator, a strong role for the state, an appropriate financing model, industrial development, nuclear safety, radioactive waste and spent fuel management, and the long-term nature of the entire programme.
The two documents also show notable alignment on standardisation.
The Polish Programme assumes the use of a single technology across the entire programme, highlighting economies of scale, repeatability and the potential to reduce costs.
The Norwegian report reaches a similar conclusion based on international experience. It indicates that standardisation, serial construction and maintaining a high pace of implementation support learning effects and help reduce costs.
This is an important message: in nuclear energy, a one-off project and a serial programme represent two fundamentally different economic and organisational models.
The biggest difference? The approach to implementation risk
This is where the Polish and Norwegian approaches diverge most clearly.
The Polish document assumes that the right technology, an experienced partner, an appropriate financial model and a clear allocation of risk can reduce project risk.
The Norwegian report places much greater emphasis on the experience of actual projects.
The Commission points out that, for large nuclear power plants implemented in recent years in Western Europe and the United States, costs significantly exceeded initial estimates and the projects experienced major delays.
This represents a significant difference in approach.
In the Polish Programme, cost overruns and schedule delays are primarily risks that need to be managed.
In the Norwegian report, they are treated almost as a starting point for designing the entire implementation system.
This is where one of the most important challenges for Poland emerges.
A realistic schedule encompasses more than the construction period itself.
The Polish Programme of 2020 defined the implementation period as 2020–2033, with an outlook extending to 2040. The June 2026 update has already revised this fundamental assumption.
The Norwegian Commission takes a broader view of the implementation timeline.
In the Commission’s assessment, a country launching a nuclear programme from scratch should expect at least 20 years from the preparation stage to the commissioning of its first nuclear power plant. The IAEA itself refers to a period of 10–15 years from the political decision to launch the process, but this does not include earlier analyses, institutional preparation or democratic processes.
This leads to a very important question:
Should the schedule of a nuclear programme measure only the time required to prepare and construct the power plant, or should it also include the time required for the state to develop the capabilities necessary to implement it successfully?
The Norwegian approach clearly favours the latter perspective.
Governance may be more important than the technology itself
Under the Polish Programme, coordination and supervision of programme implementation are assigned to the minister responsible for energy.
The Norwegian report, drawing on the IAEA approach, places much greater emphasis on the need to establish a dedicated coordinating structure such as NEPIO — Nuclear Energy Programme Implementing Organization.
Its role is not to build the nuclear power plant. Rather, it is intended to create a mechanism that integrates the state’s preparations across numerous parallel areas: regulations, competencies, licensing, safety, financing, site selection, infrastructure, public communication and waste management.
The report also refers to the IAEA Milestones Approach, comprising three phases, three milestones and 19 infrastructure areas requiring preparation.
This is probably one of the most important differences between the two documents.
The Polish model focuses primarily on implementing the investment programme.
The Norwegian model places much greater emphasis on the state’s ability to manage the investment programme.
Financing: different assessments, similar conclusions.
The Polish document assumes a significant role for the state and for a strategic co-investor linked to the technology provider.
Early selection of a foreign partner is intended to enhance the credibility of the project, support access to financing and reduce the cost of capital.
The Norwegian report is considerably more sceptical about the economics of new nuclear power plants.
The Commission concludes that, based on current cost and electricity price forecasts, nuclear energy is not economically viable in Norway.
At the same time, the Commission makes a very important observation: it is not aware of any nuclear power plant currently being built or planned in Western Europe that does not benefit from some form of state support or state-backed risk mitigation.
Despite their different starting points, the two documents therefore arrive at a similar conclusion:
Nuclear energy is an investment in which the cost of capital and the allocation of risk between the investor and the state are of fundamental importance.
Human resources and competencies: an often underestimated challenge.
The Polish Programme identifies human resource development as one of its core tasks and also envisages strengthening the capacity of the National Atomic Energy Agency.
The Norwegian report approaches this issue in a more systemic way.
It highlights the need to develop competencies not only in reactor technology, but also in regulation, project management, radiation protection, cybersecurity, emergency preparedness and planning.
The Commission also notes that developing the required competencies takes many years and that a shortage of nuclear specialists could become a Europe-wide challenge.
This is particularly relevant given the number of nuclear programmes currently being planned in parallel across Europe.
Supply chain: local content or the ability to deliver the project?
This is another interesting area of divergence.
The Polish Programme focuses, among other things, on preparing domestic industry to participate in the implementation of nuclear investments.
The Norwegian approach looks at the same issue primarily from the perspective of project resilience.
The report notes that some critical elements of the global nuclear supply chain are highly concentrated, with only a small number of countries possessing facilities with the capabilities and certification required to manufacture the most demanding nuclear components.
From the perspective of a nuclear programme, this means that local content cannot be considered in isolation from the availability of global suppliers, certification schedules and the actual capabilities of domestic industry.
Waste and decommissioning: the programme should be designed from the end.
The Polish Programme provides for systemic solutions regarding radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, although these matters are largely addressed through separate strategic documents.
NOU 2026:4 integrates waste management and plant decommissioning much more strongly into the overall decision-making process.
The report goes so far as to state that decommissioning should already be planned at the stage when an application for a nuclear licence is submitted.
Finland provides a very good illustration of this approach: construction of a deep geological repository began in 2004, and its commissioning is planned for 2026.
This illustrates the timescale involved.
A nuclear programme does not end when the reactor enters operation. In reality, it represents an institutional and financial commitment extending across generations.
Public acceptance is not an information campaign.
In the Polish Programme, public communication and information are treated as one component of implementation.
The Norwegian approach goes further.
NOU treats public acceptance as a condition for programme feasibility, rather than merely as a communication activity.
The report highlights the importance of trust, participation by local communities, transparency of the process, local influence over decisions and long-term dialogue. It also warns that a lack of public support can lead to conflict, costly delays and even the complete termination of projects.
This represents a fundamental philosophical difference.
The issue is not simply how to convince society to support the programme.
The issue is how to design the decision-making process in a way that will retain social legitimacy over several decades.
What can Poland learn from the Norwegian approach?
Comparing the two documents does not lead to the conclusion that Norway has developed a “better” nuclear programme. Norway does not yet have such a programme.
What it does have, however, is something extremely valuable: a methodology for assessing the conditions that must be met before such a programme can become a viable national project.
From Poland’s perspective, several areas are particularly important:
programme governance, staged decision-making, realistic scheduling, cost-risk management, competence development, supply-chain resilience, full life-cycle planning and lasting public acceptance.
The Polish Nuclear Power Programme provides a strong answer to the question:
Why does Poland need nuclear energy and what does it intend to build?
The Norwegian NOU provides a much stronger answer to another question:
How should the state prepare itself so that it is genuinely capable of implementing such a programme?
Perhaps the most important lesson for Poland’s nuclear programme lies precisely at the intersection of these two approaches.
At the current stage, the debate should no longer focus exclusively on the question “should we build?”
A much more important question is:
Now that the decision has been made, have we already created all the organisational, competence-related, regulatory, financial and social conditions required to deliver the programme according to schedule, within budget and in line with its intended objectives?
At NEXUS Consultants, we believe that an increasing share of the discussion about the future of Poland’s nuclear energy programme should now focus precisely on this level.